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CONTESTS OF ANDREIA IN PROCOPIUS’ GOTHIC WARS
MICHAEL EDWARD STEWART
Show them, therefore, as quickly as possible that they are Greeks1 [Γραικοί] 
and unmanly [ἄνανδροι] by nature and are merely putting on a bold front 
when defeated, do not consent that this experiment of theirs proceed 
further.
(Procopius, Wars 8.23.25-26)
Throughout Roman history, notable wars often produced notable historians. The 
sixth-century conflicts of the Byzantine Empire were no exception.2 In the History 
of the Wars, Procopius provided a memorable description of the Empire’s battles 
against the Persians in the East and the reconquest of the lost Western Provinces 
of the Roman Empire against the Vandals in North Africa and the Goths in Italy. 
In his account, Procopius attempted to place the martial deeds of the sixth-cen-
tury Romans alongside the accomplishments of the heroes of ancient Greek and 
Roman literature.3 This paradigm is particularly prevalent in the Gothic Wars.4 
Much of the recent work on Procopius has focused on Secret History. Pro-
copius’ views on gender—particularly his attitudes towards the imperial couple, 
Justinian (ruled 527-565) and Theodora, and the Eastern Roman general Belisar-
ius and his wife Antonina found in the Secret History—have received particular 
attention.5 Yet, the crucial role that gender constructions play in his other writ-
1 I have changed the translator Dewing’s “Greeklings” for Γραικοί to “Greeks”. 
2 The terms “Eastern Roman” and “Byzantine” Empire will be used interchangeably to 
describe what Procopius and his contemporaries thought of still as simply the “Roman 
Empire.”
3 For just two allusions in the Wars to the deeds of earlier Greek and Roman soldiers, 
see Procopius, Wars 1.1.6, 8.29.4-5. For a lucid exploration of this theme in Procopius’ 
proem, as well as a discussion of how it differs from that of Thucydides, see Maria 
Kouroumali, Procopius and the Gothic War (Ph.D. diss.). Oxford University 2005, 19-
26.
4 Following Kouroumali, Procopius (cited n. 3) I would suggest that Books V, VI, and 
VII of Gothic Wars covering events in Italy from 535-550 were published around 550-
551. Book VIII, which described the on-going wars in Italy and Persia from 551-553 
was probably published in late 553 or 554 shortly before Procopius’ death.
5 Much of this work has been the by-product of the upsurge of research focusing on the 
Parekbolai 4 (2014) 21-54 http://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/parekbolai
https://doi.org/10.26262/par.v4i0.4253
22 Michael Edward Stewart
ings has garnered far less notice. This essay concentrates on one theatre of war, 
Italy, and examines how Procopius used the field of battle as a means to comment 
on the role that courage and manliness played in determining the outcome of 
the war. The choice to limit the discussion to the Gothic Wars has been taken 
purposefully. I would suggest that the gendered theme is most prevalent in this 
section of Wars.6 The conflict, in Procopius’ telling, offered the Byzantines the op-
portunity not only to regain Italy, but also to test their military and manly virtues 
against a worthy enemy, the Goths. A close reading of the numerous character 
sketches found in Gothic Wars will reveal that issues of ἀρετή (“goodness”,“ex
cellence”,“virtue”) and the age-old belief in the gendered dichotomy between 
ἀνδρεία (“manliness”,“manly spirit”,“courage”) and ἀνανδρία (“unmanliness”, 
“cowardice”) play a significant role throughout the narrative.7 Indeed, in Gothic 
Wars Procopius often compared and contrasted the manliness and courage of the 
Eastern Romans with the martial Goths.8 Moreover, we will see that the tradi-
tional trope concerning the subtle distinction between rashness and courage un-
derlines much of Procopius’ account. On the one hand, desperate circumstances 
often drove men to take reckless yet ultimately courageous and manly actions; 
role of women in the early Byzantine Empire. Some of the best examples of these stud-
ies include: J. Herrin, In Search of Byzantine Women: Three Avenues of Approach, in 
Av. Cameron – A. Kuhrt (eds.), Images of Women in Antiquity. Detroit 1983, 167-
89; P. Allen, Contemporary Portrayals of the Byzantine Empress Theodora (A.D. 527-
548), in B. Garlick – S. Dixon – P. Allen (eds.), Stereotypes of Women in Power: 
Historical Perspectives and Revisionist Views. New York 1992, 93-103; A.-M. Talbot, 
Women, in G. Cavallo (ed.), The Byzantines (trans. Th. Dunlap – T. Lavander Fa-
gan – Ch. Lambert). Chicago 1997, 117-43; L. James, Empresses and Power in Early 
Byzantium. London 2001; L. Brubaker, Sex, Lies, and Textuality: the Secret History of 
Prokopios and the Rhetoric of Gender in Sixth-Century Byzantium, in L. Brubaker 
– J. Smith (eds.), Gender in the Early Medieval World: East and West, 300-900. Cam-
bridge 2004, 427-47. H. Ziche, Abusing Theodora: Sexual and Political Discourse in 
Procopius. Βυζαντιακὰ 30 (2012-13) 311-323.
6 The unity of the narrative on the Italian campaign found in books V, VI, VII, and VIII 
is discussed by Kouroumali, Procopius (cited n. 3) 12. The schematic nature of Pro-
copius’ depiction of the Gothic kings in Gothic Wars is discussed by A. Kaldellis, Pro-
copius of Caesarea: Tyranny, History, and Philosophy at the End of Antiquity. Phila-
delphia 2004, 107. For the more realistic depictions of battle found in Gothic Wars in 
comparison to those found in Persian and Vandalic Wars, see B.D. Shaw, War and Vio-
lence, in G.W. Bowersock – P. Brown – O. Graber (eds.), Late Antiquity: a Guide to 
the Postclassical World. Cambridge 1999, 132-3.
7 For the centrality of this concept in classical Greece and Rome, see R. Rosen – I. Slui-
ter (eds.), Andreia: Studies in Manliness and Courage in Classical Antiquity. Boston 
2003. 
8 This gendered debate in late fifth and early sixth-century Italy is discussed in detail by J. 
Arnold, Theoderic and the Imperial Restoration. Cambridge 2014.
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on the other hand, unthinking acts of rashness revealed weakness and unmanli-
ness, and led regularly to difficulties for the Romans and the Goths. Victory on 
the field of battle, in Procopius’ telling, was determined primarily by which side, 
Roman or Goth, best navigated the fine line between manliness and unmanliness.
Theoderic: The Manly Protector
Procopius opened the Gothic Wars by relating his version of events that had led 
to Theoderic’s and the Goths’ rise to power in Italy. In his introduction, Procopius 
explained that his history would be a story of three peoples: the Goths, the Ital-
ians, and the Romans.9 Military matters and men’s martial virtues play a key role 
in Procopius’ prologue. Indeed, the decline of the “native” Western army and the 
demilitarisation of the Italian populace, according to the historian, represented 
one of the primary reasons for the loss of Italy.10 Similar to Synesius’ argument 
from nearly a century and a half before, in Procopius’ eyes, as the barbarian 
make-up of the Western army grew stronger, the native element grew weaker.11 
In Procopius’ opinion, these “barbarians” had no grasp of Roman law and little 
respect for the “native” population. Barbarian control of the army led to an in-
ability on the part of the Western Romans to protect themselves from the “for-
eigners” who “tyrannically” demanded a share of the lands of Italy.12 Under the 
inept rule of the last Western Roman emperors, the “barbarian” generals became 
the true power behind the throne. In 476, a group of these rebellious barbarians 
proclaimed one of these strongmen, Odoacer, king. Odoacer deposed the West-
ern Roman emperor.
9 Procopius, Wars 5.1.1-2: “I shall now proceed to the Gothic War, first telling all that be-
fell the Goths [Γότθοις] and Italians [Ἰταλιώταις] before this war”. In the next sentence, 
he described the Eastern Roman Zeno, as “the reign of Zeno in Byzantium [Bυζαντίῳ]”. 
Though Procopius used the term “Byzantine” or at times “Greek” to describe the East-
ern Romans, the historian’s preferred term was “Roman”. He also distinguished (e.g., 
Wars 5.1.26) between Goths and Italians in the post-Roman kingdom. P. Amory (Peo-
ple and Identity in Ostrogothic Italy, 489-554. Cambridge 1997, 120) asserts that in the 
later part of the fifth-century Western Romans began calling themselves Itali in order 
to distinguish themselves from the Eastern Romans. He suggests that this development 
broke down some of the social barriers between the Western Romans and the Goths. In 
this essay, the terms “Roman”, “Eastern Roman”, and “Byzantine” army will be used in-
terchangeably.
10 Cf. Procopius’ comments at the opening of the Vandalic Wars (Wars 3.3.15) describing 
the two fifth-century Western generals, Boniface and Flavius Aëtius, “as the last of the 
Romans” immediately after he had described the enfeebled and effeminate rule of Val-
entinian III.
11 Synesius, On Kingship 14.
12 Procopius (Wars 3.5.12-13) described a similar land-grab by the Vandals in North Af-
rica.
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In contrast to the Western Romans, who accepted barbarian rule and domi-
nation of the army, Procopius suggested that the Eastern Romans’ continued 
adherence to a martial lifestyle and control over their armed forces had allowed 
them to continue to utilise the barbarians as their pawns. One finds an example 
of this paradigm in Procopius’ description of the Eastern Roman Emperor Zeno’s 
adept use of allied barbarians to punish his enemies. In Procopius’ version of 
events, Zeno convinced Theoderic the Amal to gather his forces in Thrace and 
the Balkans and to march into Italy to eliminate Odoacer.13 Procopius depicted 
this confrontation as something more than a clash between two “barbarian” 
peoples. He, in fact, made an effort of “de-barbarising” Theoderic somewhat. He 
highlighted the Goth’s patrician rank and the fact that Theoderic had attained 
“consular office in Byzantium”. After a fierce struggle, Theoderic slew Odoacer 
and took control of Italy. Despite emphasising his subordinate position to the 
Roman emperor and his role as a barbarian “king” [ῥὴξ, 5.1.26], Procopius made 
the rather extraordinary claim in a work that would have been read in imperial 
circles that Theoderic held the qualities appropriate “to one who is by birth an 
emperor”.14 The historian even blamed Theoderic’s “unjust” execution of the 
Roman senators and consuls, Boethius and Symmachus, on the treachery of his 
advisors.
Throughout the Gothic Wars, Procopius portrayed Theoderic’s reign as a 
“Golden Age”.15 In a theme that marks many of his subsequent portraits of the 
Gothic leadership, Theoderic frequently acted the opposite way one might expect 
of a barbarian rex.16 The Gothic king undoubtedly treated the Italians with justice 
and compassion, especially in comparison with what Procopius portrayed as the 
tyrannical rule of the Vandals in North Africa and of Odoacer’s short reign in 
13 Perhaps in an effort to magnify the Eastern Emperors’ power, Procopius exaggerated 
the Byzantine leadership’s ability to control men like Theoderic and to influence politics 
in the fifth-century Western Roman Empire. 
14 Procopius, Wars 5.1.29. J. Arnold (Theoderic, the Goths, and Restoration of the Ro-
man Empire. Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan 2008, 75) goes so far to say “Theod-
eric’s reign … constituted much more than simply a king along the same lines as other 
‘barbarian’ kings of the West. He was a Roman emperor, acknowledged as such by his 
own subjects and presented as such, though in a deferential and conciliatory manner, to 
the East.” Cf. the more restrained views found in J. Moorhead, Theoderic in Italy. Ox-
ford 1992, 77-78.
15 See, e.g., Procopius, Wars 7.9.10, 7.21.12, 23.
16 For Procopius’ use of such inversions in his accounts of the Gothic rulers, see G. Hal-
sall, Funny Foreigners: Laughing at Barbarians in Late Antiquity, in G. Halsall (ed.), 
Humour, History, and Politics in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages. Cambridge 
2004, 106-11.
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Italy. Procopius certainly respected the Gothic king’s martial qualities. Theoderic 
ruled as a military leader, and, in Procopius’ view, part of his success stemmed 
from his ability to provide stability and a renewed sense of military pride to the 
Western Romans. Procopius’ portrait also revealed the Gothic king’s mastery of 
the “intellectual” virtues that allowed a good leader to treat his subjects justly. 
Procopius emphasised that Theoderic’s juxtaposition of “wisdom and manliness” 
[ξυνέσεώς τε καὶ ἀνδρίας] allowed him to both “observe justice” [δικαιοσύνης], 
and to protect Italy from barbarian invaders. These traits earned Theoderic “the 
love of the Goths and the Italians”.17 The question of whether the Italians owed 
greater loyalty to their current “protectors”, the Goths, or to the Byzantines, rep-
resented a recurrent topic in the Gothic Wars. According to Procopius, this issue 
of fidelity had little to do with the Eastern and Western Romans’ shared past, 
but more on which side, Goth or Byzantine, could both better protect the “non-
martial” Italians from foreign threats and treat them “justly”.18
These are remarkable views for a Byzantine writer to express. The irony that a 
barbarian ruler seemed the only man capable of protecting Italy from barbarian 
invaders would not have been lost on Procopius’ contemporary audience.19 Be-
side the fact that these sentiments may have represented Procopius’ true feelings 
towards the Gothic monarch, I can think of three other possible reasons for such 
effusive praise.20 Firstly, this flattering description of Theoderic may represent a 
barb aimed at Justinian, whose humble origins, lack of battle experience, and in-
17 Procopius, Wars 5.1.27-29: ἔρως τε αὐτοῦ ἔν τε Γότθοις καὶ Ἰταλιώταις.
18 See, e.g., Procopius, Wars 7.4.16, 7.9.10-15, 7.30.24.
19 Western Italo-Roman propaganda frequently used the idea that the Goths under Theo-
deric were protecting the Italians from the barbarians, e.g. Ennodius, Panegyricus dic-
tus Theoderico 12.69.
20 Procopius often provided a nuanced view of foreign peoples he generally labeled as bar-
barians. While, at times, he displayed the traditional Greco-Roman distrust of “barbar-
ians”, overall, his attitude towards foreign peoples like the Goths and the Vandals seems 
quite enlightened. Geoffrey Greatrex argues that Procopius’ sympathetic portrayal of 
the Goths mirrored other sixth-century writers’ flexible attitude towards “barbarians”, 
and reflected the blurring of boundaries between Eastern Romans and foreign peoples 
in the sixth century. G. Greatrex, Roman Identity in the Sixth Century, in St. Mitch-
ell – G. Greatrex (eds.), Ethnicity and Culture in Late Antiquity. London 2000. See 
too A. Kaldellis’ comment [Procopius of Caesarea (cited n. 6) 221] that Procopius 
“treated Romans and barbarians impartially, condemning the former as often as he 
praised the latter”. Cf., however, Av. Cameron (Procopius and the Sixth Century. Lon-
don 1985, 239) who argues that Procopius attempted to preserve the “established order” 
by creating “a strong demarcation between civilised peoples and barbarians”, and W. 
Goffart (Barbarian Tides: the Migration Age and the Later Roman Empire. Philadel-
phia 2006, 94-96) who uses Procopius’ account of the Herules to make the larger claim 
that Procopius wanted to expel all the barbarians from the Roman Empire.
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ability to fend off barbarian incursions into Byzantine territory earned Procopius’ 
scorn in Secret History.21 Secondly, it may be a veiled insult aimed at the Italians, 
who in Procopius’ mind were incapable of protecting their own lands. Finally, it 
allowed Procopius to present Theoderic as a manly archetype whose character 
could be compared to those of his Gothic successors and the leading Byzantine 
generals, and in particular, Belisarius.
Procopius based much of his esteem for Theoderic on the monarch’s ability 
to be both a political and military leader. It was, however, Theoderic’s martial 
virtues that the historian appeared to have admired most. At the close of his 
biographical sketch, in fact, Procopius explained that it was Theoderic’s ability 
to make “himself an object of terror to all of his enemies” that contributed to his 
lasting legacy.22
Athalaric: Boys to Men
For Procopius, Theoderic’s strong leadership helped to unify the Goths. So too 
had the king largely succeeded in maintaining the bond between Italians and 
Goths. The historian’s descriptions of the king’s flawed successors revealed the 
difficulty of maintaining this unity. Before his death, Theoderic had named his 
ten-year-old grandson Athalaric as his heir, and appointed his daughter and the 
boy’s mother Amalasuintha, as regent.23 Many within the Gothic aristocracy had 
a difficult time accepting a dynastic succession dependent solely on the Amal 
line.24 Yet, in Procopius’ telling, the early years of Amalasuintha’s regency were 
a relatively peaceful and stable time for Italy.25 Amalasuintha sought to restore 
harmonious relations between the Goths and the Romans by distancing herself 
from some of the less tolerant policies of Theoderic’s final years (proof too that 
Procopius’ praise of Theoderic may not have been completely heart-felt). Pro-
copius declared that she protected the Romans from the Goths’ “mad desire to 
wrong them” [ξυνεχώρησεν ἐς τὴν ἐκείνους ἀδικίαν ὀργῶσιν]. Additionally, she 
21 As Kaldellis [Procopius of Caesarea (cited n. 6) 60] points out, contrasts can be made 
as well with Procopius’ negative portrait of Justinian in Secret History, where the histo-
rian described the eastern Emperor as a land-hungry tyrant.
22 Procopius, Wars 5.1.31. As Whately explains (Descriptions of Battle in the Wars of 
Procopius. Ph.D. diss., University of Warwick 2009, 318), Procopius praised Belisarius 
for being an object of fear amongst his soldiers. See, e.g., Procopius, Wars 3.12.8-22, 
6.8.1-18. 
23 Amalasuintha was the daughter of Theoderic’s second wife Audofleda, the sister of the 
Merovingian king Clovis.
24 P. Heather, The Goths. Oxford 1996, 250-55.
25 Procopius tells (Wars 7.21.12) his readers that by 550 many Goths recalled the years of 
Theoderic’s and Athalaric’s rule fondly.
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attempted to reconcile herself to the senate by returning Symmachus’ and Bo-
ethius’ confiscated lands to their families.26 Amalasuintha and her supporters 
reigned supreme, yet trouble lurked in the hearts of Gothic men spurned by the 
new regime.27
Procopius compressed the ten-year period of Athalaric’s rule into a didactic 
tale that appears to unfold over a much shorter time-frame.28 According to Pro-
copius, the struggle began as a dispute over the proper way to educate Athalaric. 
Amalasuintha felt compelled to raise the boy as a Roman aristocrat.29 She sent 
him to a Roman school of letters and hired three “prudent and refined” [ξυνετούς 
τε καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς, 5.2.7] Gothic tutors to further educate the future king. Procopius 
illustrated how this decision created a backlash among some members of the 
Gothic nobility who wanted to raise the boy in “the barbarian fashion”. He wrote:
All the notable men among them gathered together, and coming before 
Amalasuintha made the charge that their king was not being educated cor-
rectly from their point of view nor to his own advantage. For letters, they said, 
are far removed from manliness [ἀνδρίας], and the teaching of old men results 
for the most part in a cowardly [δειλὸν] and submissive spirit. Therefore the 
man who is to show daring [τολμητήν] in any work and be great in renown 
ought to be freed from the timidity [φόβου] which teachers inspire and to 
take his training in arms. . . . ‘Therefore, O Queen’, they said, ‘have done with 
these tutors now, and do you give Athalaric some men of his own age to be 
his companions, who will pass through the period of youth with him and thus 
give him an impulse toward that excellence [τὴν ἀρετὴν], which is in keeping 
with the custom [νόμον] of barbarians’.
The “martial” faction emphasised the “dangers” of a literary education by claiming 
that Theoderic refused to allow the Goths to send their children to school; they 
suggested that he took this stance because he believed that a literary education 
26 Procopius, Wars 5.2.5-6.
27 Herwig Wolfram claims (History of the Goths, trans. Thomas Dunlap. Berkeley 1999) 
that these men were Gothic hardliners who took a tough stance against Constantinople. 
He suggests that members of this faction, who probably included Theodahad among its 
members, realised by late 532/early 533 that they needed to gain control over Athalar-
ic before he reached his majority. It remains, of course, difficult to know how much 
of Procopius’ depiction is based on actual events. Procopius revealed (Wars 5.4.12-13) 
that Theodahad had initiated a coup in 535 with the support of the relatives of the large 
numbers of Goths who had been slain by Amalasuintha and her followers. 
28 Discussed in Amory, People and Identity (cited n. 9) 156. 
29 For further contemporary evidence of Amalasuintha’s adulation of classical learning, 
see Cassiodorus, Variae 10.3.
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would cause them “to despise sword or spear”.30 One assumes that Procopius 
and his contemporary audience were aware of the illogic of this argument, since 
Procopius tells his audience about Theoderic’s daughter Amalasuintha’s and his 
nephew Theodahad’s excellent classical educations.31 While this discrepancy 
and other incongruences in his history may be the result of Procopius’ heavy 
emphasis on rhetorical themes and disregard for the “truth”, it is also possible 
that he purposefully has the “martial” Goths tell a known non-truth. As we will 
see throughout the remainder of this chapter, Procopius often utilised such inac-
curacies in his set-speeches as a means of later undermining the speakers’ overall 
argument.32
In this stylised episode, Procopius transformed an internal Gothic power 
struggle into a didactic debate about the proper way to educate young men. While 
he simplified a complex political dispute, Procopius provided his audience with 
the differences—real and imagined—between Roman and Gothic methods and 
beliefs about the best way to transform boys into manly men.33 Each of the Gothic 
factions suggested that boys travelled a long and hazardous path to manhood. 
The two sides only differed on the best methods to overcome these obstacles. 
The “conservatives” preached that in order to instil courage in a young man, he 
needed to be surrounded by companions of a similar age and “take his training 
in arms”, while Amalasuintha and the Goths presumably following Roman tradi-
tions, focused on the development of a boy’s mind.34 
Despite its obvious rhetorical aspects, this episode has some historical basis. 
Evidence from the Gothic side supports Procopius’ characterisation of Amalasu-
intha as being devoted to Roman literature. For example, in a letter to the Roman 
senate, Amalasuintha espoused the benefits of a Roman education by suggesting 
30 Procopius, Wars 5.2.11-17.
31 The sixth-century historian John Malalas (Chronicle, 15.9) tells us that Theoderic had 
received an education during his years in Constantinople, a point that Procopius, with 
his focus on the Gothic king’s early embracing of Byzantine culture, may have been 
aware of. So too does Theoderic’s panegyrist Ennodius (Panegyricus dictus Theoderi-
co 3.11) make it clear that Theoderic had received an education in Constantinople. Cf. 
Theophanes (AM 5977). Contra Anon. Valesiani 12.61.
32 So too, as Jonathan Arnold has pointed out (pers. comm.) did the “martial faction” sup-
port ultimately the unmanly Plato-loving Theodahad.
33 Of course, some young men from the Byzantine literate classes would have received 
military training as well. On the increasing militarization of the sixth-century ruling 
classes in Byzantium, see C. Whately, Militarization, or the Rise of a Distinct Military 
Culture? The East Roman Elite in the 6th Century AD, in: St. O’Brien – D. Boatright 
(eds.), Warfare and Society in the Ancient Mediterranean: Papers arising from a collo-
quium held at the University of Liverpool, 13th June 2008. Oxford, 2013, 49-57.
34 Procopius, Wars 5.2.11-17.
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that literary learning allowed the warrior to discover “what will strengthen him 
with courage; the prince learns how to administer his people with equity”.35 In 
the Greco-Roman literary tradition even innate virtues like ἀνδρεία and one’s 
martial skills could be enhanced by a literary education.36 Although we know 
very little about what constituted a “Gothic” education, we do know that officers’ 
children received substantial military training, and that the upper echelon of 
Gothic society embraced the soldier’s life.37
Evidence from the remainder of Athalaric’s biography appears to show that 
Procopius rejected the barbarians’ idea that a young man’s curriculum should 
involve military training alone. Procopius, in fact, responded to the barbarians’ 
claims about the unmanliness of a Roman education, by demonstrating how 
Athalaric’s exposure to the “customs of the barbarians” produced a “failed man”. 
Fearing her political rivals, Amalasuintha dismissed the tutors and replaced them 
with a group of Gothic boys who, like Athalaric, “had not yet come of age”.38 
Predictably, in Procopius’ view, this decision proved disastrous. Instead of pro-
viding Athalaric with an inclination towards manly ἀρετή, his comrades only 
enticed the future king “to drunkenness and to intercourse with women” [μέθην 
καὶ γυναικῶν μίξεις], qualities that in the classical tradition represented typi-
cal vices of not only barbarians, but of unmanly men as well.39 For Procopius, 
Athalaric’s inability to control both his drinking and sexual appetites marked 
him as flawed—and ultimately—as an unmanly man.
35 Cassiodorus, Variae, 10.3 (trans. Barnish). 
36 J. Connolly, Like the labors of Heracles: Andreia and Paideia in Greek Culture under 
Rome, in Andreia: Studies in Manliness and Courage in Classical Antiquity, R. Rosen – 
I. Sluiter (eds.). Boston 2003, 287, 328. 
37 Amory, People and Identity (cited n. 9). For the Goths’ military ethos, see P. Heath-
er, The Goths, 322-26; M. Whitby, Armies and Society in the Later Roman World, in 
The Cambridge Ancient History, XIV, Av. Cameron – Br. Ward-Perkins – M. Whitby 
(eds.). Cambridge 2000, 472. 
38 Procopius, Wars 5.2.18-20.
39 Procopius, Wars 5.2.19. Athalaric’s alcoholism is hinted at in the Variae of Cassiodorus, 
see S.J.B. Barnish, introduction to Variae, 16. Procopius revealed that an addiction “to 
the disease of drunkenness” [μέθης νόσῳ] was particularly prevalent among barbarian 
peoples (Wars 4.4.29, 6.1.28, 7.27.5-6). This point is illustrated when Procopius praised 
the Herul Pharas for his energetic and serious nature, but noted sarcastically: “For a 
Herulian not to give himself over to treachery and drunkenness, but to strive after up-
rightness, is no easy matter and deserves abundant praise (Wars 4.4.29)”. The suscepti-
bility of barbarian armies to drunkenness served as a topos in classical literature. This 
drunkenness made “barbarians” unreliable soldiers. For instance, Polybius (Histories 
11.3) partly blamed the Carthaginians’ defeat in Spain on the Gauls’ drunken state dur-
ing the battle of Metauras (207 BC). 
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Procopius closed his didactic tale by showing how Athalaric, having aban-
doned Amalasuintha and a “civilised” way of life, fell victim to this “debauched” 
Gothic lifestyle and died of a wasting disease brought on by the overindulgence 
in wine and the relentless pursuit of women.40 Procopius appears to have wanted 
to highlight the folly of permitting mere boys to educate a future king about 
manly ἀρετή. Torn between two worlds, Athalaric fell short of becoming either 
a Gothic warrior or a cultivated Roman aristocrat. I would suggest, however, that 
this account is less a tale about the “impossibility” of amalgamating “Roman” and 
“Gothic” ideals, as has been suggested by one recent study,41 but more a way of 
comparing and contrasting the martial and manly qualities of the Romans and 
the Goths. We shall see that each time a Goth made a claim of masculine and 
martial superiority, shortly after Procopius “proved” the assertion patently false. 
One may observe this paradigm in the case of Athalaric. Ultimately, in Procopius’ 
mind, it was his “barbarian” and not his “classical” education that turned Athalaric 
into a leader with an unmanly lack of self-control. 
 
Amalasuintha: Manly Woman
Procopius repeated his gendered theme with a slight twist in his depiction of 
Amalasuintha. In the Wars and the Secret History Procopius described Amalasu-
intha as “an aristocrat and a queen”.42 He continued by illustrating her beauty and 
wit (Procopius’ praise may be a veiled attack at the empress Theodora). Procopius 
attributed many of Amalasuintha’s virtues, however, to her “extraordinary mas-
culine bearing” [μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ διαφερόντως ἀρρενωπόν].43 By overcoming 
her enemies’ attempts to usurp her control over Athalaric, she earned Procopius’ 
praise for not acting “woman-like” and feebly giving way to her enemies.44 The 
historian claimed that the queen overcame the “limitations” of her sex and took 
on the qualities of an ideal and manly leader. Similar to his praise of Theoderic’s 
intelligence and manliness, Procopius proclaimed that she was wise, just, and 
“displayed very much a masculine nature” [τῆς δὲ φύσεως ἐς ἄγαν τὸ ἀρρενωπὸν 
ἐνδεικνυμένη].45
40 Procopius, Wars 5.4.4. 
41 Kaldellis, Procopius of Caesarea (cited n. 6) 108. 
42 For a similar gendered presentation of Amalasuintha in Cassiodorus’ Variae, as well as 
a full discussion on the historical context of the gendered relationship between Amala-
suintha and Theodahad, see Cr. La Rocca, Consors regni: a problem of gender? The 
consortium between Amalasuntha and Theodahad in 534, in Studies in the earlier mid-
dle ages of Pauline Stafford, J. Nelson – S. Reynolds – S. Johns (eds.). London 2012, 
127-143.
43 Procopius, Secret History 16.1.
44 Procopius, Wars 5.2.21. 
45 Procopius, Wars 5.2.3 (my trans.).
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Procopius’ depiction of Amalasuintha as a “manly woman” needs some ex-
planation because it seems to go against his assertions elsewhere that “mascu-
line” women transgressed nature. The first five chapters of Secret History, in fact, 
traced the disastrous consequences of allowing women to take on men’s dominate 
masculine roles in the political and the private arenas. A closer examination of 
Procopius’ description of Amalasuintha’s character reveals, however, that she fit 
into his and classical Greco-Roman literary visions of femininity. Some of the 
virtues of the ideal political leader—restraint, courage, and wisdom—were seen 
typically as masculine traits; on the other hand, feminine virtues “had little to 
do with political rule”. 46 Despite her manly virtues, Amalasuintha’s leadership 
depended on men’s support, and Procopius portrayed her as a defenceless woman 
in need of Justinian’s protection. When her political position became too tenuous 
she attempted to hand “over the power of the Goths and Italians to the Emperor 
Justinian, in order that she herself might be saved”.47 Although Amalasuintha 
ruled briefly within her own kingdom, she remained subordinate to Justinian and 
dependent upon men within the Gothic aristocracy for her survival.48Procopius 
suggested that only under exceptional circumstances should women take on 
masculine roles. He suggested that Amalasuintha faced such a situation at the 
outset of Athalaric’s reign when she needed to take on an active role in order to 
protect her family from her enemies within Gothic Italy.49
An examination of Procopius’ depiction of the Amazons from book eight of 
the Gothic Wars adds further insight into his attitudes towards Amalasuintha’s or 
any women’s ability to take on what he considered “masculine” responsibilities. 
He made it clear that the Amazons were not “a race of women endowed with the 
qualities of men”, but the remnants of a people whose men had been destroyed in 
46 A point made by Kaldellis, Procopius of Caesarea (cited n. 6) 144-45. 
47 Procopius, Wars 5.3.13.
48 A. D. Frankforter, Amalasuntha, Procopius and a Woman’s Place. Journal of Women’s 
History 8 (1996) 42.
49 Procopius, Wars 5.2.10-18. A similar instance (Wars 1.24.32-9) of this paradigm occurs 
when Theodora stiffened Justinian’s resolve during an uprising known as the Nika re-
volt, convincing him not to flee Constantinople but to remain in the capital and fight. L. 
Garland (Byzantine Empresses: Women and Power in Byzantium, AD 527-1204. Lon-
don 1999, 32-33) regards this episode as an instance of Theodora taking on a masculine 
and martial role. I would agree with Av. Cameron, Procopius and the Sixth Century 
(cited n. 20) 65, however, that the speech is better understood as an example of the 
traditional “protective wife” supporting and defending male family members. Cf. Wars 
3.13.24 where Procopius praised Belisarius’ wife Antonina –a woman he attacked ruth-
lessly in Secret History– for saving her husband’s life and helping avert a disaster by safe-
guarding a warship’s water supply.
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war. Fear of their people’s annihilation, not a reversal of human nature, had forced 
these women to embrace “manly valour [ἀρρενωπὸν]”, by arming themselves and 
performing “a deed of the utmost courage [ἄριστα ἔργα ἀνδρεῖα]”.50 According 
to Procopius, although women like the Amazons and Amalasuintha could put on 
temporarily a “masculine nature” and perform heroic deeds, it went against the 
natural order. Sheer necessity compelled both the Amazons and Amalasuintha 
to take on masculine roles. In the case of the Amazons, the death of all of their 
male soldiers drove them to take up arms to face their enemies. Similarly, after 
the death of Theoderic, a lack of suitable male heirs and the rather exceptional 
attempt to maintain the Amal line, forced Amalasuintha to fill the void and take 
on a leading role in protecting her son and the Italian people from the (barbarous) 
elements in the Gothic leadership.51 For Procopius, this reversal of gender roles 
had its limits. While Amalasuintha and the Amazons could for a time display 
manly valour and emulate the excellence of men, without the support of real 
men, they all were fated to die young.
This reliance on ancient Greek literary conceptions of “manly women” helps 
to explain why Procopius depicted Amalasuintha’s taking on a masculine role 
positively, whilst he attacked Theodora and Antonina in Secret History for do-
ing the same thing by stepping outside their gender constraints.52 It seems likely 
that, in Procopius’ mind, as a “barbarian”, Amalasuintha could more easily break 
established gender roles. Indeed, in the classical tradition “manly women” repre-
sented largely a foreign phenomenon. In addition, manly women ruled typically 
in places where men were unmanly.53 One may presume then that Procopius’ 
depiction of Amalasuintha was based on these traditional precedents, and as 
such, Procopius used her manliness as a means to, on the one hand, praise the 
Gothic queen and, on the other, to comment on the character defects of her male 
rivals to the Gothic throne, and in particular, her royal colleague after Athalaric’s 
death, the Gothic king Theodahad (ruled 534-536).
 
Theodahad: Unmanly Man
The defeat of the Vandals gave Justinian the confidence to retake Italy from the 
Goths. Procopius explained that the emperor had secretly negotiated with Amala-
50 Procopius, Wars 8.3.7 (my trans.).
51 La Rocca suggests (Consors regni, 131) that Amalasuintha was “retained in Italy, to 
give a successor to Theoderic’s kingdom.”
52 Cameron, Procopius and the Sixth Century (cited n. 20) 199-200, in particular, criti-
cises Procopius for this seeming inconsistency.
53 S.E. Harrell, Marvelous Andreia: Politics, Geography, and Ethnicity in Herodotus’ 
Histories, in Rosen – Sluiter (eds.), Andreia (cited n. 7) 83. 
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suintha to restore Italy to Roman rule. However, when Athalaric died in 534, 
political considerations forced Amalasuintha to ally herself to her cousin Theo-
dahad by making him co-ruler. Ingratiating himself to Amalasuintha’s enemies, 
Theodahad, however, imprisoned and then murdered her in 535.54 
Though the modern political scientist might see Theodahad’s moves as the 
actions of a prudent and astute politician, Procopius depicted these deeds as evi-
dence of Theodahad’s unstable and unmanly nature. Procopius used his rather 
banal characterisation of Theodahad as another example of men destroying their 
ἀρετή, by failing to balance study and military training. He wrote: 
There was among the Goths one Theodahad by name, son of Amalafrida, the 
sister of Theoderic, a man already of mature years, versed in the Latin literature 
and the teachings of Plato, but without any experience whatever in war and 
taking no part in active life [δραστηρίου], and yet extraordinarily devoted to 
the pursuit of money[φιλοχρηματίαν]. This Theodahad had gained possession 
of most of the lands in Tuscany, and he was eager by violent methods to wrest 
the remainder from their owners.55 
Procopius did not necessarily criticise Theodahad for his love of learning, but 
primarily for his failure either to follow the virtues he had learned in writers like 
Plato, or to balance his zeal for literature with a zest for the military life.56 In fact, 
Theodahad represented the antithesis of the ideal ruler praised by Plato, who 
typically rejected φιλοχρηματία and sought to safeguard his subjects’ property.57 
Theodahad represents an anti-Theoderic. It is important to point out, however, 
that Procopius did not necessarily see the Gothic king’s hunger for other peoples’ 
land as a barbarian trait. In Secret History, Procopius condemned Belisarius for 
similar “crimes” in Italy. I would suggest that Procopius saw both instances as 
examples of unmanly behaviour.58 
Moreover, Procopius did not necessarily fault Theodahad for his attempt to 
become a Romanised Goth; Procopius, who claimed Theodahad was by “nature 
unmanly” [φύσει ἄνανδρος], criticised the Gothic king for allowing his love of 
54 Procopius (Secret History 16.5) claimed that Theodahad had murdered Amalasuintha at 
Theodora’s behest. 
55 Procopius, Wars 5.3.1. Further evidence of Theodahad’s literary learning is found in 
Cassiodorus, Variae 10.3. On the Goths’ seizures of Italian land, see Cassiodorus, Vari-
ae 8.28.
56 Kaldellis, Procopius of Caesarea (cited n. 6) 110, contends that Procopius presented 
Theodahad as a failed “philosopher king,” proposing that this analogy reveals the influ-
ence of Plato’s Republic on Procopius’ perceptions of ideal and non-ideal kingship.
57 Plato, Republic 391c.
58 Procopius, Secret History 5.4-7.
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learning to thwart his fighting spirit.59 When the Gothic king faced the prospect 
of confronting Justinian’s invading forces, Procopius described how Theodahad’s 
lack of a “firm mind”, combined with his fear of war, caused Theodahad to enter 
into a state that Procopius described as “the antithesis of boldness”.60
Behind much of this rhetoric is the ancient idea linking indecision and a fickle 
mind to unmanliness and vice. Procopius demonstrated that Theodahad’s inabil-
ity to be “steadfast”, display a “fighting spirit” live an “active” life [δραστήριος] or 
to observe “justice” exposed him as “unmanly”. Using Theodahad as an example of 
an “unmanly” leader allowed Procopius to lay bare the difficulties and the perils 
of amalgamating the “manliness” of a warrior-king with the finer refinements of 
Roman civilisation.61
According to Procopius, kind, yet “soft or effeminate” rulers were often too 
weak to face the rigors of war. Yet, this softness was not always due to one’s ro-
manitas. He described the Vandalic king Hilderich (ruled 523-30), as “easily 
approachable” and “altogether gentle” towards Christians and all of his subjects. 
However, when faced with battle, his “softness in war” [πόλεμον μαλθακός] forced 
Hilderich to rely on his nephew Hoamer, the “Achilles of the Vandals”, to fight 
his battles. It must also be remembered that Procopius frequently praised the 
manliness and fighting abilities of Roman generals like Germanus, an aristocrat 
who had almost certainly received a Roman education.62 So too, as we will see 
below, does Procopius frequently praise other generals, Roman and barbarian, 
for displaying martial qualities based upon their romanitas. Thus, I reject the 
dominant modern view that posits that Procopius saw Theodahad’s indecision, 
failure to grasp philosophy, and greed as necessarily “barbarian” traits, but more 
as tell-tale markers of his unmanly nature and a trait that could afflict Roman as 
well as barbarians. 63
With Theodahad’s “unmanly” reign, the “martial” Gothic factions’ accusa-
tion that a Roman education made a leader unmanly seemed to have come true. 
Yet, like many themes in the Wars, the answer may not be so straightforward. 
Theodahad’s inability to adhere to the virtues found in the literature he read was 
not necessarily a natural result of his “barbarian” nature. As we observed in the 
cases of Amalasuintha and the Gothic tutors, Procopius knew of “barbarians” 
who could master the finer nuances of a Roman literary education. Certainly, the 
59 Procopius, Wars 5.9.1.
60 Procopius, Wars 5.7.11. I have changed the translator Dewing’s “opposite extreme of 
unspeakable boldness” for ἀντικαθίστη θράσος to “the antithesis of boldness”.
61 Procopius, Wars 3.9.1.
62 Procopius, Wars 7.40.9. 
63 E.g., Halsall (cited n. 16) 106; LaRocca (cited n. 42) 140.
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ancient Greek and Roman literature that Procopius was familiar with provided 
examples of barbarians who had mastered a Hellenistic education.64 I would sug-
gest, then, that Procopius’ portrait of Theodahad represented only the opening 
salvo in his exploration on the similarities and the differences between Gothic 
and Roman notions of virtue and manly courage. The remainder of his account 
of the campaigns in Italy tells the tale of Gothic kings who, on paper at least, 
represented the martial and manly archetype of the barbarian warrior-king es-
poused in these early rhetorical set pieces. It is to these “martial” Gothic leaders 
that we now turn. 
Vitigis and Belisarius: the Fine Line between Manliness and Unmanliness
Fed up with Theodahad’s disastrous and unmanly leadership, the Goths replaced 
him with the celebrated warrior Vitigis (ruled 536-540).65 Procopius explained 
that the new king faced a difficult political situation. An ongoing conflict with the 
Franks in the north, coupled with Belisarius’ invasion in the south, meant that 
Vitigis needed to cope with the dangerous prospect of a two-front war (a peril 
that Procopius knew that the Byzantines would soon face themselves). Having 
replaced the inactive and unmanly Theodahad, Vitigis emphasised in a speech 
to his troops that his hesitancy to confront straightaway the Byzantine forces 
stemmed from tactical necessity rather than any effeminate fear of war:
The success of the greatest enterprises, fellow soldiers, generally depends, 
not upon hasty action at critical moments, but upon careful planning…. 
For the title of the coward [δειλίας], fittingly applied, has saved many, 
while the reputation for bravery [ἀνδρείας] which some men have gained 
at the wrong time, has afterward led them to defeat …. For a man’s worth 
[ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν] is revealed by his deeds, not at their commencement, 
but at their end.66
64 Procopius’ familiarity with, and grasp of, classical literature is discussed in Greatrex, 
“Classical Past”.
65 Procopius, Wars 5.11.5. Vitigis had earned his military reputation with an important 
victory over a combined Gepid and Herul army in 530. The Goths murdered Theo-
dahad in December 536 shortly after Vitigis’ coup. For an account of these events, see 
Wolfram, History of the Goths (cited n. 27) 340-43.
66 Procopius, Wars 5.11.12-22. This speech mirrors Vitigis’ own propaganda, e.g. Cassio-
dorus Varia 10.31 (trans Barnish): “I was chosen not in the privy chambers, but in the 
wild open field. I was not sought among the subtle debates of sycophants, but as the 
trumpets blared” [Non enim in cubilis angustiis, sed in campis late patentibus electum 
me esse noveritis, nec inter blandientium delicate colloquia, sed tubis concrepantibus 
sum quaesitus]. The gendered aspects of this letter are discussed by La Rocca (cited n. 
42, 141).
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Other scholars have noted the importance of this particular speech for under-
standing Procopius account of Vitigis’ reign and the main themes of the Gothic 
Wars. Like many set-speeches in the Wars, this seemingly innocuous address 
allowed Procopius to foreshadow future events.67 The speech contains two im-
portant Procopian themes in the Gothic Wars concerning masculine ideology 
and good leadership. First, an ideal leader needed to see the larger picture, and 
base his military decisions, not on furthering his own personal glory, but on what 
would, in the long-term, benefit of his soldiers and his cause. A man needed to 
remain steadfast—even if others labelled his strategy cowardly or effeminate. 
On numerous occasions in the Wars when leaders responded to attacks on their 
manliness with reckless displays of courage, disaster soon followed.68 Second, 
like many ancient intellectuals, Procopius commented frequently on the fine 
distinction between rashness and courage.69 In classical Greek θράσος describes 
either recklessness or valour. Aristotle had considered ἀνδρεία as “the attributes 
of a man whose actions demonstrate a moderate negotiation between ‘boldness’ 
[θάρσος] and ‘fear’ [φόβος]”. As Karen Bassi puts it, “the andreios man neither 
fears too much or too little”.70 A man’s capacity to maintain this precarious balance 
depended largely upon his ability to suppress his natural urges to either launch 
a rash attack or turn tail in a cowardly retreat. These distinctions regularly sepa-
rated the manly from the unmanly in the classical literary tradition. Procopius 
used the term in both senses.71 On the one hand, desperate circumstances often 
drove men to take reckless yet ultimately courageous and manly actions; on the 
other hand, unthinking acts of rashness revealed weakness and unmanliness, and 
led regularly to men’s downfall.72 These concepts certainly represented a primary 
theme throughout the Gothic Wars, in which Procopius went to great lengths to 
compare and contrast the leadership abilities of Belisarius and Vitigis and the 
martial courage and manliness of their men.
67 Kaldellis, Procopius of Caesarea (cited n. 6) 32.
68 Cf. Procopius, Wars 1.18.13-29, 1.18.19-26.
69 Some examples include, Procopius, Wars 5.20.8, 6.23.29-30. Cf. Thucydides, Pelopon-
nesian War 2.40.3.
70 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 1228a26-30a37, 1230a26-33, quoted in K. Bassi, The seman-
tics of manliness in Ancient Greece, in Rosen – Sluiter, Andreia (cited n. 7) 25-58, 
esp. 52-53.
71 For the influence of Aristotle on Procopius’ writings, see Kaldellis, Procopius of Cae-
sarea (cited n. 6) 149, 212, 220. For the influence of Aristotle on Late Antique culture in 
general, see Chr. Wildberg, Philosophy in the Age of Justinian, in CCAG, ed. Michael 
Maas. Cambridge 2005, 324-28.
72 For a description of how desperation could evoke unprecedented deeds of manly cour-
age, see Wars 6.21.30-33, 8.35.21. 
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An early example of these tests of our protagonists’ manliness and courage 
came when Vitigis made his move on Rome with his revitalised army. Hoping 
to buy some time before reinforcements from the East arrived, Belisarius and 
his soldiers sought to stall the Gothic advance on Rome by making “a display 
of their own daring [θάρσους]”.73 Procopius’ use of θάρσος here seems to signal 
to the reader that this first contest between the revitalised Goths and the Ro-
mans would represent a test of a less rational type of courage. Without a doubt, 
Belisarius acted somewhat out of character, and made the unusual decision for an 
early Byzantine general to fight like a common soldier.74 Belisarius and his men 
made the dangerous decision to meet a group of Goths in a face-to-face trial of 
their martial prowess. In fact, Belisarius’ intellectual prowess, which represented 
one of his primary advantages over his “barbarian” opponents, played a minimal 
role in this fighting.75 It was probably no coincidence that in a contest based on 
θάρσος, the fighting was on foot, brutal, and hand-to-hand. Procopius seemed 
to be of two minds about this choice of combat; he admired Belisarius’ courage, 
but, in the historian’s own words, “The cause of the Romans was thrown into 
great danger, for the whole decision of the war rested with him”.76 
As another specialist on battles has noted, it is here that the narrative takes a 
very Homeric turn.77 In Procopius’ telling, any Goth with a claim to ἀρετή made 
a beeline towards Belisarius. As the focal point of the fighting and the narrative, 
Belisarius displayed all the martial skills typical of a Homeric hero; he slays en-
emies left and right. Yet, even the mightiest warrior at times needed assistance. 
Luckily, for the general, and for the Romans’ cause, Belisarius’ personal guards 
made a display of ἀρετὴ that, as Procopius somewhat hyperbolically described it, 
“had never been shown by any man in the world to this day”. The “undermanned” 
Byzantines, according to Procopius, met the enemy on their own terms in basic 
hand-to-hand combat and showed that they were more than a match for the 
martial valour of the Goths. In Homeric fashion, the historian praised the fight-
ing prowess and heroic conduct of the Goths as well as the Romans.78 Procopius 
73 Procopius, Wars 5.17.18. 
74 The late sixth-century military guidebook, Maurice’s Strategikon (2.16), advised against 
commanders fighting amongst the front ranks, preferring that generals should avoid 
battle and limit their actions to directing the formations “and adapting to the move-
ments of the enemy”.
75 On the importance of a general’s intellect in determining the outcome of battles, see 
Maurice, Strategikon 2.1.
76 Procopius, Wars 5.18.5.
77 Whately, Descriptions (cited n. 22) 304.
78 Procopius made special mention (Wars 5.18.29-33) of the fighting prowess of Belisarius 
and a Gothic warrior, Visandus Vandalarius.
38 Michael Edward Stewart
discussed the loss of many notable fighters on each side. Yet, in the end, Belisarius’ 
and his men’s superior ἀρετή won out, and the vanguard of “barbarians” fled back 
to their main army.79 Belisarius and his men, however, were not yet quite out 
of danger because the Gothic cavalry remained unchecked. Here, in Procopius’ 
mind, Belisarius made the more responsible decision; he fled back to the safety 
of Rome. Pursued closely by the enemy, Belisarius arrived at the gates of Rome 
only to find that the “Italians manning the gates of the city” thought that the gen-
eral had died in battle. Accordingly, fearing a ruse, they refused the general and 
his men entry into the city. Only quick thinking on the part of Belisarius saved 
the day, and after one last dangerous skirmish, Belisarius and his men gained 
entrance into Rome.80
“Trapped” in the city of Rome, Belisarius and the Byzantines appeared to be 
at the mercy of the marauding Goths preparing to lay siege. Here, Procopius split 
the narrative’s perspective three ways: Goth, Italian, and Byzantine. The Goths 
and the Italians saw the situation similarly—the Goths expected an easy victory, 
and the Italians dreaded what they saw as the inescapable storming of Rome 
and their inevitable punishment for their unfaithfulness to their “masters” the 
Goths.81 On the other hand, Belisarius remained smugly confident. To build ten-
sion, Procopius took his time to explain Belisarius’ optimism. In fact, everything 
seemed to point to an easy Gothic victory. Once again, however, not everything 
was quite as it appeared. Certainly, Procopius made it clear that the Romans could 
not trust their Italian “allies”. Brimming with confidence, the Goths attempted to 
undermine the alliance and the confidence of the Italians guarding the Salarian 
gate by belittling the manliness of their “allies” in Belisarius’ army:
He [Vacis] began to reproach the [inhabitants of Rome] Romans for their 
faithlessness to the Goths and upbraided them for the treason which he said 
they had committed against both their fatherland and themselves, for they had 
exchanged the power of the Goths for Greeks [Гότθων δυνάμεως Γραικοὺς] 
who were not able to defend them, although they had never before seen any 
men of the Greek race come to Italy except actors of tragedy and mimes and 
thieving sailors.82
Vacis’ portrait of Belisarius and his men as “Greeks” reflected contemporary 
Gothic propaganda. This set-speech illustrates that perhaps one way that the 
Gothic leaders may have attempted to gain the Italian Romans’ support in their 
79 Procopius, Wars 5.18.16.
80 Procopius later (Wars 5.27.25) described this skirmish as a Byzantine defeat.
81 Procopius, Wars 5.19.1.
82 Procopius, Wars 5.18.40-1. On this passage and the pejorative use of the term Graikoi, 
see W. Kaegi, Procopius the Military Historian, BF 15 (1990) 79-81.
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war against the Byzantine Empire was by trying to sever the Western and Eastern 
Romans’ sense of a shared identity and history. By calling Belisarius’ heteroge-
neous army “Greeks”, Vacis not only split the two sides, but also played upon the 
traditional Roman belief that Greek soldiers were soft, lazy, and reluctant to fight 
in “a real man’s war”.83 Vacis’ suggestion that Greek culture produced only actors 
and mimes aroused another Roman prejudice. For the Romans, the performing 
arts represented the dangers of civilised luxury. Actors, singers, and dancers were 
considered particularly effeminate and representative of a weak and unmanly 
culture.84 Procopius’ version of Vacis’ speech suggested, because of their warrior 
traditions, that it was natural for the Goths to presuppose that they were not only 
more valorous than the Byzantine soldiers, but, also manlier. Such rhetoric had 
defined the regime of Theoderic from the beginning.85
Though it is probable that Procopius’ made up the details in Vacis’ speech, its 
inclusion at this stage of the narrative appears purposeful. As one recent paper 
has suggested, Procopius seemed to have meant for Vacis’ address to be “ironic 
and incongruous, in that a barbarian is accusing the citizens of Rome of that 
stereotype of barbarism, unfaithfulness”.86 While this argument may be true, I 
would suggest that Procopius’ larger point appeared to have been an effort to 
highlight the Goth’s dismissive conviction that they were facing an unmanly 
threat from Belisarius and his men. As we shall see the Goth’s vision of the Ital-
ians as untrustworthy was largely accurate. In fact, in Procopius’ telling, they 
were prone to switch sides and betray both the Goths and the Byzantines.87 The 
statement that would soon be proven false was Vacis’ contention that Belisarius 
83 The Greeks’ reputation in the Roman literary tradition for an unmanly love of luxury 
and the “soft” life is discussed by C.A. Williams, Roman Homosexuality. Ideologies of 
Masculinity in Classical Antiquity. New York 22010, esp. 62-70, M. Kuefler, The Man-
ly Eunuch. Masculinity, Gender Ambiguity, and Christian Ideology in Late Antiquity, 
Chicago 2001, 47. Near the close of the Gothic Wars (8.28.2) another Gothic command-
er provides us with a more accurate picture of Justinian’s forces, describing Narses’ ar-
my as a “heterogeneous horde of barbarians”.
84 Williams, Roman Homosexuality, (cited n. 83) 135-9.
85 As Jonathan Arnold has observed (Restoration of the Roman Empire, cited n. 14, 117) 
in his astute study on Theoderic’s Italy, the Goths and Italians went to great lengths to 
paint themselves as “true” Romans, whilst depicting the Eastern Romans as unmanly 
Greeks. Arnold writes: “Goths and Gothicness represented martialism, the old Roman 
virtue of virtus (the very source of the term virtue), which meant “manliness” or “cour-
age.” Virtus was an ideal that the Romans had seemingly lost, becoming overly effemi-
nate (perhaps even overly Greek), yet which until recently had been most Roman in-
deed”. 
86 Halsall, Funny Foreigners (cited n.16), 110.
87 See, e.g., Procopius, Wars 7.4.16.
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would not be able to protect the Italians. It was likely this misconception that 
Procopius sought to rebuff.
Clearly, Procopius rejected the notion that the Byzantines lacked the courage 
or the manliness to defend Rome. In Procopius’ mind, it was the Italians who 
were the “true” non-martial people unable to protect their native land. In fact, 
throughout the narrative the Goths and the Romans at least agree on one point: 
the idea that the Italians were a soft and an unmanly people in need of protec-
tion.88 As the situation in Rome deteriorated, Procopius noted that the Italians 
were completely unprepared for the rigours of a siege. Because the civilians and 
the Italian soldiers guarding the city were convinced that Vitigis’ army would 
soon defeat Belisarius, fear took hold throughout the city. They railed against 
Belisarius and his men, questioning the general’s decision to confront the Goths 
before reinforcements had arrived. The Italians ridiculed Belisarius for his advice 
“to take courage [θαρσεῖν], and to look with contempt upon the barbarians”. So 
too did they scoff at the general’s supreme confidence that he would easily con-
quer the Goths.89
In another set-speech, the Gothic ambassadors who met with Belisarius and 
the Roman senators shortly after this debate expressed Procopius’ attitudes about 
the over-confident Goths and the meek Italians. Addressing Belisarius with a 
group of Roman senators looking on, the Gothic envoy, Albis, highlighted the 
two aspects of θάρσος. “Rashness [θράσος] is different from courage [ἀνδρεία]”, 
he proclaimed, “for rashness, when it takes possession of a man, brings him into 
danger with discredit, but bravery bestows upon him an adequate prize in a 
reputation for valour [ἀρετῆς]”. The Gothic diplomat suggested mockingly that if 
Belisarius and his men had attacked the Goths outside the gates of Rome because 
of a belief in their ἀνδρεία, then by all means they should take the opportunity to 
“play the manly man” [ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι] in battle against the Goths. However, 
if, as the Gothic envoy believed, the Romans had been temporarily possessed by 
“rashness” [θράσει] when they decided to make that attack then the Goths would 
give them the opportunity to “repent … the reckless undertaking”. The emissary 
concluded his speech with a final attempt to get the Byzantines to capitulate by 
requesting that Belisarius “not cause the sufferings of these Romans (Italians) 
to be prolonged any further, men whom Theoderic fostered in a life not only of 
soft luxury [βίῳ τρυφερῷ] but also of freedom, and cease your resistance to him 
(Vitigis) who is master both of the Goths and of the Italians”.90
88 See, e.g., Procopius, Wars 3.3.10-13, 7.11.12-14.
89 Procopius, Wars 5.18.42.
90 Procopius, Wars 5.20.9-12. I have changed Dewing’s “play the man” for ἀνδραγαθίζε-
σθαι to “play the manly man”.
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Belisarius response made it clear that the idea that the city of Rome belonged 
to anyone but its rightful owners, the Romans, was ridiculous. Procopius showed 
Belisarius asserting that he was made of sterner stuff than the feeble Italians were, 
proclaiming in heroic language, “As long as Belisarius lives, it is impossible to 
relinquish the city”.91 According to Procopius, when the envoys returned to camp, 
Vitigis asked his representatives what sort of man they faced in Belisarius. The 
envoys replied that the Goths would never be able to make Belisarius give up the 
city by frightening him. With the description above, we can see how Procopius 
used seemingly trite rhetorical set battle pieces, repetitive vocabulary, and bom-
bastic set-speeches to set up his reader for the combat and the “lessons” to come. 
The Goths who had met with Belisarius and his men had only just realised what 
Procopius and his readers already knew, the fact that Belisarius and his men 
were not the unmanly or “rash” men the martial Goths had been expecting to 
rout easily in battle. Once again, we find that the Gothic version of the situation 
given in a dramatic set-speech represented the polar opposite of the reality. In 
fact, we are soon to learn that the Goths are the rash side, and that Belisarius was 
motivated not by θράσος, but by a justified belief in his side’s superior ἀνδρεία.
As the battle for Rome opened in earnest, the more intellectual and strategic 
Belisarius came to the fore. When the general noticed the approaching Goths’ 
siege engines, he chuckled to himself and restrained his men from attacking 
until he gave the order. The Italians once again expected the worst, and accused 
Belisarius of feigned bravery and of purposefully avoiding battle. Belisarius knew, 
however, that his defensive position had given his archers a significant advan-
tage over the Goths lumbering along with their siege engines. When Belisarius 
finally gave the go ahead to fire, his bowman decimated the Goths.92 As Pro-
copius explained, the calculating Belisarius had exploited the “simplicity of the 
barbarians”.93 Having been bested previously in brutal hand-to-hand warfare, the 
Goths proved even less of a match for the Romans’ material, tactical, and strategic 
superiority. After Procopius related often-gruesome scenes of battle, Belisarius 
and his men emerged triumphant. Procopius painted a vivid picture of the shift 
in morale. Ebullient in victory, the Byzantines sang the praises of Belisarius and 
collected their spoils, while the humiliated Goths “cared for their wounded and 
bewailed their dead”.
91 Procopius, Wars 5.20.18.
92 Procopius’ focus on the prowess of Belisarius’ archers and the advantage that it gave to 
the Byzantines in the Italian campaign is discussed in detail by Whately, Descriptions 
of Battle (cited n. 22) esp. 264-70.
93 Procopius, Wars 5.27.27.
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Procopius described how this setback transformed Vitigis into an impetuous, 
and ultimately, an unmanly man. Made increasingly desperate by his numer-
ous setbacks at the hands of Belisarius’ forces during his siege of Rome, Vitigis 
launched a hopeless attack against the Byzantine army.94 The Gothic king sent 
five hundred horsemen against the Byzantine commander Bessas’ one thousand 
cavalry. Procopius explained that Vitigis had failed to “account for the difference 
between the two armies in point of equipment of arms and of practice of warlike 
deeds”.95 The battle ended in a rout, with only a few soldiers returning to the Goth-
ic camp. Vitigis chastised the survivors, “insisting that cowardice [τῷ ἀνάνδρῳ] 
had caused their defeat”. Three days later, continuing to fume irrationally, Vitigis 
selected another five hundred men and “bade them to make a display of valor-
ous [ἀρετῆς] deeds against the enemy”. The astute reader harks back to Vitigis’ 
speech at the opening of his reign preaching the necessity of preparation before 
battle and the benefits of seemingly unmanly retreats. Inevitably, for Procopius, 
the Romans’ numerical and tactical superiority allowed them to rout the impru-
dent enemy “without any trouble”. While the Goths lamented that these defeats 
proved that “fortune stood against them”, Belisarius provided a more mundane 
explanation for the Byzantine’s victories. He suggested that the Romans’ and their 
allies, the Huns’, use of mounted bowman had provided their crucial edge over 
the Goths, who lacked experience in this type of warfare.96 The reader knows that 
Procopius throughout his narrative has provided a third reason. He has shown 
that the Goths had underestimated both the martial capabilities and the manly 
virtues of their foes, the Byzantines.
After relating Vitigis’ increasingly irrational behaviour, Procopius immedi-
ately exposed how the Byzantines’ growing confidence made them susceptible 
to over-confidence. On the cusp of breaking the Goths’ fighting spirit, Belisarius 
succumbed to his soldiers’ pressuring.97 Elated with their numerous triumphs 
over the Goths, the Roman army coaxed a reluctant Belisarius “to risk a deci-
sive battle with his whole army”. Belisarius replied that his hesitance to fight a 
decisive battle resulted, not because he detected any “softness” [μαλακίαν] in his 
men, nor because he “was terrified at the strength of the enemy” [τῶν πολεμίων 
94 Probably in an effort to create a more vivid didactic narrative, Procopius ignored sev-
eral Gothic victories during the yearlong siege that began in February 537. These omis-
sions are discussed by Wolfram, History of the Goths (cited n. 27) 344-45.
95 Procopius, Wars 5.27.15.
96 Procopius, Wars 5.27.15-29.
97 Common tradition allowed Roman generals to solicit and accept advice from their 
commanders. G. Greatrex, Rome and Persia at War, 502-532. Leeds 1998,179-80, n. 
30. 
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κατορρωδήσας τὴν δύναμιν], but because his current strategy of skirmishing was 
going so well.98 Belisarius opined, “When one’s present affairs are going to one’s 
satisfaction, it is inexpedient to change to another course of action”. However, 
after witnessing his men’s enthusiasm, Belisarius gave in:
Since I see that you are eager for this danger, I am filled with confidence and 
will never oppose your ardour [ὁρμῇ]. . . . I see that the present moment is 
also in our favour, for it will, in all probability, make it easier for us to gain 
mastery over the enemy, because their spirit has been enslaved by what has 
gone before. For when men have often met with misfortune, their hearts are 
no longer wont to thrill even slightly with manly valour [ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι].99
The Romans went on to suffer a defeat on the plains of Nero. Belisarius’ lapse 
of judgment helped end any hopes for a quick victory over the Goths, indicat-
ing, that even at this early stage of his history, Procopius detected some flaws 
in Belisarius’ ability to lead men.100 An ideal general did not care what his men 
thought of him, but rather based his tactics purely on what advantages might be 
gained for his forces and the Byzantine Empire.101 
Like his earlier lapse against the Persians, Belisarius’ failure, however, proved 
to be temporary. Vitigis failed to follow up on his victory. Unable to penetrate 
Rome’s defences, and facing the threat of a Byzantine attack on the Gothic royal 
city of Ravenna, the Gothic king abandoned the siege in March 538. He retreated 
with his army first to Ariminum, and finally to Ravenna—where he would spend 
the next two years facing an increasingly deteriorating situation. Vitigis failed 
98 Belisarius avoided major engagements with the Gothic army. Of course, Narses ulti-
mately defeated the Goths by seeking just such a confrontation.
99 Procopius, Wars 5.28.6-14.
100 Most scholars agree with Cameron’s contention (Procopius and the Sixth Century (cit-
ed n. 20) 8, 15, 52-54) that as the Italian campaign dragged on, Procopius developed an 
increasingly negative attitude towards Belisarius. Kaldellis suggests, however, that an 
underlying negativity towards Belisarius is found throughout the Wars, see A. Kaldel-
lis, Procopius’ Persian War: a Thematic and Literary Analysis”, in R. Macrides (ed.), 
History as Literature in Byzantium. Burlington, VT. 2010, 255-56. As Conor Whately 
has suggested to me (pers. comm.) it seems Procopius’ opinion of the general shifted in 
terms of his military successes or failures.
101 Procopius’ portrait of Belisarius as a man easily influenced by others is similar to his 
negative portrait of the general in Secret History. In this work, Procopius criticised 
Belisarius for allowing his wife Antonina to take on the masculine role in their relation-
ship, claiming that he became her “faithful slave not her husband”. Procopius, Secret 
History 4.30-1. It is also possible that, similar to his account of battle of Callinicium, 
Procopius was trying to exonerate Belisarius by explaining a well-known defeat to his 
contemporary audience, as a momentary lapse of judgment from which he soon recov-
ers.
44 Michael Edward Stewart
in his attempt to secure allies against the Byzantines. His efforts to relieve his 
forces besieged in Auximum and in Faesulae came to naught as well.102 Finally, 
in late 539, Belisarius and his army arrived at the gates of Ravenna. The besieger 
became the besieged.
Procopius showed how these events continued to change Vitigis from an 
esteemed soldier at the outset of his reign into a leader reviled by his former sup-
porters for his “unmanly” [ἀνάνδρως] leadership and “ill fortune” [ἀτυχῶς] by 
its end.103 Vitigis’ response to setbacks was markedly different from Belisarius’ 
usual quick recoveries from his mistakes or military setbacks. Fearing that their 
opponents might think the Goths had succumbed to ῥαθυμία,104 Vitigis called 
on the Goths starving in Auximum and Faesulae “to endure manfully” [φέρειν 
ἀνδρείως].105 Yet, when the Gothic leader faced his own peril, he acted in a de-
cidedly unmanly manner. Instead of resisting Belisarius’ siege, Vitigis sought a 
way out of his predicament by seeking a truce with the Byzantines.106 Finally, 
after a series of failed negotiations between the two warring parties, Belisarius 
managed to capture Vitigis and most of his entourage by feigning to accept the 
Gothic nobles’ offer to declare him emperor of the West.107
Procopius concluded book six with a rather melancholy description of the 
vanquished Gothic forces marching downtrodden through the streets of Raven-
na in May of 540.108 Procopius indicated the Gothic soldiers’ humiliation was 
102 Procopius, Wars 6.24.1-16, 6.26.2-13.
103 Procopius, Wars 6.30.5.
104 Procopius, Wars 6.26.8.
105 Procopius, Wars 6.26.13.
106 Procopius, Wars 6.28.27, 6.29.2. For Procopius a man could not act courageously or 
manly when he was starving. See, e.g., Wars 8.23.15-16.
107 Procopius, Wars 6.29.18.
108 The pessimistic tone of this passage stands in stark contrast from the triumphant rheto-
ric of the earlier material on the first siege of Rome. Procopius here openly questioned 
the role that ἀρετή played in determining battles, which he attributed to the whims 
of “some divine power” [δαιμόνιον]. Kaldellis, Procopius of Caesarea (cited n. 6) 
196, argues that this sentiment reflected Procopius’ “true” feelings concerning the su-
premacy of tyche over men’s ἀρετή. This passage seems to have been inserted to create 
a bridge between the shifting tones of books six and seven. In fact, it appears close-
ly related to the ideas espoused by Totila (Wars 7.21.5-7) that were ultimately proven 
mistaken by Procopius. W. Treadgold (The Early Byzantine Historians. London 2007, 
204-05) postulates that in 545, with the war dragging on, Procopius altered the end of 
book six by adding more pessimistic material, and in turn took material from book six 
to open book seven. Belisarius’ triumphal entry into Constantinople in 540 and Pro-
copius’ subsequent encomium certainly seems somewhat out of place at the opening of 
book seven, and was probably meant to be the original finishing point for book six, and 
in fact the entire account.
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made complete when their wives—seeing the small numbers and the ordinary 
stature109 of the Byzantine soldiers who had captured the city—belittled their 
husbands for their “unmanliness” [τὴν ἀνανδρίαν], and spat in their faces.110 
The fact that Vitigis allowed himself and his army to be captured by the Romans 
seemed a particularly cowardly and unmanly way for a Gothic leader to meet 
his end. Before his victory over the Byzantines on the plains of Nero, Vitigis had 
exclaimed that “noble men [ἄνδρες γενναῖοι] consider that there is only one 
misfortune (in battle)—to survive defeat at the hands of the enemy”.111 Vitigis 
even said that Theodahad had received a “blessed” [ὄλβιον] end to his life be-
cause “he was privileged to lose both his sovereignty and his life at the hands 
of his own men”.112 Procopius probably used these earlier comments by Vitigis 
as a means of highlighting the ignominy of his end.113 Vitigis suffered the dual 
disgrace of losing both his sovereignty and freedom at the hands of his enemies; 
even worse, he was led into captivity without even making a final stand. Vitigis’ 
assertion at the outset of his reign that a man’s worth was revealed by his deeds, 
not at their beginning, but at their end, had come back to haunt the Gothic king. 
The seeming martial and “manly” supremacy of the Goths had proven inferior 
to the tactical, the material, and the martial manliness of the Byzantine soldiers.
Totila: Theoderic Reborn or Barbarian Belisarius?
Belisarius’ victory over Vitigis seems to have represented the original terminus for 
the Gothic Wars.114 The narrative drives to what looks like a logical climax, with 
Vitigis’ defeat and Belisarius’ triumphal return to Constantinople. The theme of 
a “manly” and “heroic” Roman army defeating a worthy Gothic foe would have 
made a suitable ending to the Wars. Events on the ground seemed to have inter-
fered with Procopius’ well laid out didactic tale. The year 540 marked a turning 
point in Justinian’s reconquest of Italy. 
Despite their defeat, the Goths refused to submit to Byzantine rule. In 541, 
the Gothic nobility appointed Totila (ruled 541-552) as king. Totila, a relative 
109 It is worth emphasising that the Byzantine army had many Goths and other “barbarian” 
peoples fighting in it, so this emphasis on the size discrepancy of the men in the two 
armies seems to be more of a rhetorical flourish by Procopius to promote his views that 
the Goths viewed the Byzantines as unmanly.
110 Procopius, Wars 6.29.32-4. I changed the translator Dewing’s “cowardice” for ἀνανδρίαν 
to “unmanliness”.
111 Procopius, Wars 5.29.9.
112 Procopius, Wars 5.29.6.
113 It also foreshadows both Totila’s “shameful death” and Teïas’ heroic death at the close of 
the Gothic Wars.
114 Treadgold, Byzantine Historians (cited n. 108) 204.
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of the Visigothic king Theudis (ruled 526-548), revitalised the Gothic army’s 
fighting spirit. In a series of swift campaigns, he recaptured almost all of Italy. 
Procopius now had to deal with a resurgent Goth nation and the recall of his 
idol, Belisarius. How did the historian explain such a reversal of fortune? With-
out a doubt, the mercurial nature of tyche and the power of God to determine 
events play a greater role in books seven and eight than they did in books five 
and six.115 I would suggest, however, that Procopius once again blamed Roman 
failure primarily in the familiar moralising terms. Procopius did not attribute 
the Roman defeats after 540 on the whims of fate or a lack of courage, nor did he 
suggest that they resulted from strategic failures. Instead, he treated these losses 
as arising from moral failures on the part of the Byzantine military high com-
mand and the imperial administration.116 We must take Procopius at his word 
when he explained that the “insatiable” greed of certain members of the Byzantine 
high command in Italy and within the Byzantine treasury117—not the caprice of 
fortune—represented the primary reason “the entire fabric of Roman power was 
utterly destroyed in a short space of time”.118 Once more, in Procopius’ mind, the 
“rightful” rulers of Italy would be the side that juxtaposed martial capabilities 
with a policy of restraint and justice towards the Italians. The tide of battle shifts 
to the Goths’ favour as the Byzantine generals and administration succumbed 
to jealousy, greed, bickering, and injustice.119
Totila is the undisputed hero of book seven.120As Belisarius’ and the Byzan-
tine’s fortunes decline, Totila’s and the Goths’ fortunes improve. Totila, in this 
part of the Gothic Wars, encapsulates nearly all of the leadership qualities and 
virtues found in Procopius’ encomium on Belisarius at the opening of book sev-
115 Discussed in Kaldellis, Procopius of Caesarea (cited n. 6) 198-204.
116 Procopius (e.g., Wars 7.12.1-11) too notes the seeming disinterest of Justinian in the 
Italian campaign as a reason for the Goths’ resurgence. Modern scholarly consensus 
contends that for Justinian, the war in the Italy was as fairly minor theatre of war in 
comparison to Thrace, North Africa, and the troublesome eastern boundary with Per-
sia. For a discussion of this point, see Whately, Descriptions of Battle (cited n.22) 259.
117 Procopius explained (Wars 7.1.33) that the Byzantine treasuries’ refusal to pay the sol-
diers in Italy was a primary reason for a decline in the Byzantine army’s fighting prow-
ess, not a lack of courage or the superior martial virtues or tactics of Totila and his men.
118 Procopius, Wars 7.1.24. I thus disagree with Kaldellis’ claim (Procopius of Caesarea 
(cited n. 6) 198-200) that, in this section, the historian was seeking to reject the idea 
that wars were won, not by justice, but primarily by the whims of tyche.
119 See, e.g., Procopius, Wars 7.3.15-22.
120 Procopius’ admiration for Totila is seen by most modern scholars to have been genuine. 
See, e.g., Cameron, Procopius and the Sixth Century (cited n. 20) 190, 197; Kaldellis, 
Procopius of Caesarea (cited n. 6) 198.
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en.121 Procopius certainly had much to say in this section about Totila’s mastery 
of numerous political and martial virtues. Like many of his royal predecessors, 
Totila was formidable in battle.122 Similar to Theoderic, Totila was also “ener-
getic” and wise. Totila, however, exhibited some “civilised” qualities not typical 
in a barbarian king—even Theoderic. Procopius at various times in the narrative 
described Totila as “restrained” [σωφροσύνη], “humane”, [φιλανθρωπίαν] “gentle 
[πρᾷόν], and “just” [δίκαιος].
Totila also respected his enemy. In Procopius’ version of his first address to 
his downtrodden men, though not overawed, Totila recognised that the Goths 
faced a “contest” [τὸν ἀγῶνα] for their very existence against a formidable and 
worthy Byzantine opponent. This speech contains little of the bravado, and none 
of the condescending gendered rhetoric found in earlier Gothic warriors’ set-
speeches denigrating the manliness and courage of his foes. Totila explained to 
his men, that in order to defeat the Byzantines, the Goths would have to match 
their “usual spirit of manly courage” [ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι] in battle, with deeds of 
justice and acts of humane self-restraint in their relations with the Italians. He 
made it clear that earlier Gothic defeats against the Byzantines could be attributed 
to his predecessors’ lack of concern for justice, which caused God to turn against 
them.123 He too made an effort to treat his captured foes well; a shrewd policy that 
Procopius showed led many Byzantine soldiers to desert to the Gothic side.124
This strategy proved successful. The bulk of the first half of book seven focuses 
on the Goths gradual retaking of Italy. Instead of providing a detailed account of 
the various battles and sieges that decimated Italy over the next five years, Pro-
copius concentrated instead on Totila’s philanthropy and deep regard for justice. 
Two examples should serve to demonstrate this emphasis. Shortly after Totila’s 
first capture of Rome in 546, Procopius reported how Totila felt obligated to pro-
tect Rome’s aristocratic women from acts of revenge and from sexual violence:
Now the Goths, on their part, were eager to put Rusticiana to death, bring-
ing against her the charge that after bribing the commanders of the Roman 
army, she had destroyed the statues of Theoderic, her motive in so doing 
121 As argued by Kaldellis, Procopius of Caesarea (cited n. 6) 194. Amongst many 
other virtues, the historian described (Wars 7.1.1-21) Belisarius as “gentle” [πρᾷόν] 
“generous” [φιλοδωρότατος], protective of civilians’ land, sexually “restrained” [σω-
φροσύνης], “courageous” [εὔψυχος], “daring” [εὐτολμότατος], and “steadfast” [ἀσφα-
λεῖ] in war, without being rash.
122 For the fear Totila’s fighting prowess evoked in the Eastern Roman soldiers, see Procop-
ius, Wars 7.6.19.
123 Procopius, Wars 7.4.10-18.
124 E.g., Procopius, Wars 7.16.19.
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having been to avenge the murder not only of her father Symmachus, but 
also of her husband Boethius. But Totila would not permit her to suffer any 
harm, but he guarded both her and all the Roman women safe from insult, 
although the Goths were extremely eager to have intercourse [κοίτην] with 
them. Consequently not one of them had the ill fortune to suffer personal 
insult, whether married, unwed, or widow, and Totila won great renown for 
moderation [σωφροσύνη] from this course.125 
As a modern scholar notes, Totila’s reputation for σωφροσύνη “is scarcely a virtue 
one would associate with a barbarian”.126 Totila’s civilised σωφροσύνη definitely 
distinguishes him from typical barbarian leaders, and, I would suggest, even the 
manly and wise Theoderic. It is probably no coincidence that the women that 
Procopius chose to describe Totila protecting were none other than Boethius’ 
wife and Symmachus’ daughters—the two men that the historian had revealed 
earlier had been “unjustly” executed by Theoderic. Procopius would surely have 
expected his readers to remember these earlier “crimes”. Totila, as described by 
Procopius, thus appears to represent a better version of Theoderic. Once again, 
we find Procopius deftly combining historical events with his own moralising 
themes to produce an edifying tale that interlocks each of his biographies of the 
Gothic royalty.127
We find further evidence that Procopius sought to differentiate Totila from a 
typical rough-hewn “Gothic” king or military man in another anecdote from the 
same period. An unnamed Italian accused one of Totila’s bodyguards of violating 
his virgin daughter; the Gothic king imprisoned the soldier. This prompt punish-
ment, in the words of Procopius, alarmed “the most notable men among the bar-
barians” [τῶν Βαρβάρων οἱ δοκιμώτατοι]. They requested that Totila release the 
soldier and dismiss the charges, since the assailant was an “active” [δραστήριος] 
man and “a capable warrior” [ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολέμια]. Totila, however, “gently and 
with no excitement” [πράως τε καὶ ταραχῇ οὐδεμιᾷ] refused, declaring that what 
they “called kindness [φιλανθρωπίαν] in reality was lawlessness [παρανομίαν]”. 
The Gothic king proclaimed “the act of committing a sin and that of preventing 
the punishment of those who have committed sin, are in my judgment on 
the same plane”. The nobles relented and the Goth was executed not long 
125 Procopius, Wars 7.20.29-31.
126 J. Moorhead, Totila the Revolutionary. Historia 49 (2000) 382.
127 Totila’s reputation for restraint in protecting the Italo-Romans from his army’s retribu-
tion when he captured Rome for the third time in 549 is discussed in the sixth-century 
Liber Pontificalis 61.7. Cf., however, the less positive views of Totila found in Marcelli-
nus Comes, Chronicle 49-50, Gregory, Dialogues 2.14-15, 3.12. 13.
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afterwards.128 Procopius had no qualms in presenting Totila as a man willing to 
follow justice and “lawful order” over the concerns of powerful members of the 
Gothic hierarchy. This desire to protect the Italians from harm was a trait that 
Totila shared with the other Gothic ruler who appreciated Roman law, Amala-
suintha. It certainly distanced him from the Gothic “hardliners”.129
Soon after the capture of Rome, one senses a gradual modification in Pro-
copius’ idealised characterisation of Totila.130 Though still capable of great deeds 
of moderation, the king also lashes out more frequently against the Italians and 
those he perceived as his enemies.131 In Procopius’ telling, Totila’s long-line of 
victories over the Byzantines appeared to have eroded some of his previous re-
spect for his foes, as well. In my view, the shift prepares the reader for the re-
emergence of Belisarius and the gradual revival of Byzantine fortunes to come 
in the second half of book seven. Once again, Procopius utilised a set-speech 
to mark this change. Shortly after his storming of Rome, Totila gathered all of 
his men for an address. The king explained to his men that at the outset of the 
“contest, the Goths had gathered a well-supplied host “of two hundred thousand 
most warlike soldiers….Yet, with all this in our favour, we were vanquished by 
five thousand Greeks [Γραικῶν], and for no good reasons were stripped of our 
power and everything else that was ours”. 132 “But now”, he continued, “though 
reduced to a small numbers” and meagrely armed, they had defeated an enemy 
“twenty-thousand strong”. Totila pondered how this inexplicable event had oc-
curred. Whereas, in his previous set-speech, he had attributed success in battle 
to a combination of martial prowess and just behaviour, Totila now claimed that 
the Goths’ superior ἀρετή, numbers, and armament and supplies had played 
little part in their resurgence. Instead, he proclaimed that God had supported the 
Goths because under his rule they had paid a “greater honour to justice” than in 
previous times. He concluded the speech with a warning that the Goths needed 
to continue to act justly, “for if you change your course, God too will instantly 
change his favour and become hostile to you. For it is not His wont to fight with 
128 Procopius, Wars 7.8.12-25.
129 It also seems to undermine Narses’ claim (Wars 8.30.5) shortly before the battle of 
Busta Gallorum that Totila had no regard for justice or Roman law.
130 There are earlier signs of a less-controlled and more “barbaric” Totila even before the 
siege of Rome. Procopius related (Wars 7.15.13-16) that Totila had become so agitat-
ed with the bishop Valentinus during an interrogation that he chopped off both of the 
bishop’s hands.
131 A further example of his dangerous fury is found in his desire to destroy Rome, which 
was only thwarted by a letter from Belisarius, see Wars 7.30.20-24. Cf. Wars 7.20.23-25.
132 Procopius’ use of often widely discrepant troop numbers as a narrative device is dis-
cussed by Whately, Descriptions of Battle (cited n. 22) 350-54.
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a race of men or a particular nation, but with such as show the greater honour 
to justice”.133 Immediately after giving this stark warning, however, Totila called 
on members of the Roman senate and, in Procopius’ words admonished them 
“as an angry master might be expected to say in upbraiding men who have be-
come his slaves”. He reprimanded them for allowing “the Greeks to attack their 
fatherland” and forgetting the prosperity they had attained under Gothic rule.134
Totila’s less conciliatory attitude, the power of God, and the whims of tyche 
represent only some of the elements of causation at play in this section. The 
reader soon learns that Belisarius with “courage” [τόλμα] and deeds of ἀρετή 
retook Rome from the Goths. The Byzantines then successfully defended the 
city from Totila’s furious counter-attack.135 Procopius plainly rejected Totila’s 
assertion that ἀρετή and courage played no part in deciding events. Once again, 
he had rebuffed Totila’s dismissive suggestion that the Goths were better fighters 
than the “Greeks” were. Though the reader will have to wait until the end of book 
eight, Totila’s further claim, that the Goths’ small numbers and lack of armament 
were actually beneficial to their cause, would also be undermined. As the reader 
will eventually learn, the Byzantines’ superior weaponry, greater numbers, and 
superior ἀρετή ultimately turn out to be Totila’s undoing.136Moreover, by the 
close of book seven, and throughout much of book eight, it was the Byzantine 
soldiers fighting “manfully” [ἀνδρείως] and the Goths acting disgracefully and 
forgetting their “courage”.137 The major turning point in the Italian war originated 
from Totila’s need to engage the Romans at sea, a form of combat that, Procopius 
believed, put the Goths at an extreme disadvantage.138
Despite his faults, and his deteriorating military position, Totila retained his 
military prowess. When describing Totila’s display of martial skills before the 
133 Procopius, Wars 7.21.4-12. I have changed the translator Dewing’s “Greeklings” for 
Γραικῶν to “Greeks”.
134 Procopius, Wars 7.21.12-16.
135 Procopius, Wars 7.24.1-26.
136 Procopius, Wars 8.32.7-11.
137 See, e.g., the acts of Byzantine ἀρετή and ἀνδρεία at Wars 8.23.34 (Roman soldiers’ 
fighting “manfully” [ἀνδρείως]), 8.29.22-23 (Roman soldiers make “display of valour” 
[δήλωσιν ἀρετῆς] that surpasses all others), 8.32.11 (Romans and “barbarian allies” 
at the battle of Busta Gallorum show a common προθυμία and ἀρετὴ). 8.30.1. Whilst 
examples of Gothic cowardice are found at Wars 8.23.36 (Goths make a “disgraceful” 
[αἰσχρὰν] retreat), 8.24.3 (Goths in fear after suffering disgraceful defeat) 8.30.7 (Goth-
ic soldiers terrified before the battle of Busta Gallorum). 8.32.19 (Gothic soldiers make 
a panicked retreat at Busta Gallorum).
138 So too did Justinian’s decision to refocus on the Italian campaign after years of “neglect” 
contribute to the Byzantine’s resurgence, according to Procopius (Wars 8.26.7).
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fateful battle of Busta Gallorum, Procopius did little to hide his admiration for 
the bellicose king’s prowess and intimidating persona. He wrote: 
He was not reluctant at all to make an exhibition to the enemy of what manner 
of man he was. The armor in which he was clad was abundantly plated with 
gold and ample adornments which hung from his cheek-plates as well from 
his helmet and spear were not only of purple [the colour of the Roman em-
perors] but in other respects befitting a king, marvellous in their abundance. 
Attempting to delay the Romans while he waited for his reinforcements to ar-
rive, Totila performed a “dance” upon his horse and “hurled his javelin into the 
air and caught it as it quivered above him, then passed it rapidly from hand to 
hand, shifting it with consummate skill”. Totila displayed many of the martial skills 
one would expect from a man raised for battle. Procopius remarked that Totila 
was “like one who has been instructed in the art of dancing from childhood”.139
This display of fighting prowess before the battle, however, did Totila and the 
Goths little good against the well-supplied and supremely confident Byzantines. 
The intelligent Byzantine eunuch-general Narses alertly refused to accept Totila’s 
ruse that he would fight in eight days hence; Narses correctly prepared his men 
to fight the next day. Narses made it clear to his men before battle that his side 
held all the tactical and strategic advantages. They had greater numbers, better 
equipment, and superior ἀρετή.140 Although generals in Procopius’ set-speeches 
often over-stated their side’s advantages before battle, these comments by the eu-
nuch Narses prove prescient. In the battle, the Byzantine army overwhelmed the 
Gothic forces, slaying the king and most of his men.141 In Procopius’ description, 
tyche and/or God play little role in deciding the outcome of the actual events on 
the ground.142 The immediate cause of the Goths’ defeat was, in fact, straight 
forward; Procopius attributed the trouncing to Totila’s “folly” in risking his men 
in battle when the Byzantines held all the material and tactical advantages. More-
over, Totila’s decision to forego using bows and any other weapon except spears 
also proved critical. In contrast, Narses’ army made use of a variety of weapons, 
and thus were able to adapt to the shifting circumstances of combat.
139 Procopius, Wars 8.31.18-21. This anecdote appears to be another reference to the Goths’ 
focus on providing a martial education to their children. As Philip Rance (Narses and 
the Battle of Taginae (552 AD): Procopius and Sixth-Century Warfare. Historia 30 
[2005] 424-472, here 451) aptly warns, however, we should not see this display as an 
example of Totila’s “barbarian” martial manliness. Byzantine military officers in this era 
were well versed in such displays.
140 Procopius, Wars 8.29.8-10; 8.30.1.
141 Cf. Procopius, Wars 7.35.2.
142 Procopius, Wars 8.32.22-30. Though, at the end of the battle, Procopius agreed with 
Narses’ attribution (Wars 8.33.1) of victory to God.
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The manner of Totila’s death, however, clearly shocked Procopius. For a his-
torian obsessed with causation, he provided a somewhat incoherent explanation 
for the Gothic king’s seemingly ignoble death.143 In Procopius’ most reliable ver-
sion of the Gothic king’s demise, Totila died while escaping the frontlines. Pro-
copius saw Totila’s conduct as a cowardly act.144 His somewhat muddled attempts 
to find a palatable explanation for Totila’s cowardly behaviour encapsulates the 
anxieties of a man unable to understand such behaviour in a man, who, though 
not perfect, had always faced danger with courage. Procopius made it clear that 
such seismic shifts in human nature or secular events troubled him. They were 
only comprehensible if one saw them as acts of God, demons, or tyche. Certainly 
one can agree with Procopius that Totila’s end “was not worthy of his past deeds”. 
Though undeserving, once again, a “martial” Gothic king had failed to obtain a 
glorious death in battle.
Teïas’ Manly Death
For some modern readers, the Wars end on a tragic note.145 Procopius’ depiction 
of the final battle in the Wars, Mons Lactarius, was certainly sympathetic to both 
sides. Surprisingly, it was the defeated Gothic leader, who earned Procopius’ praise 
as the “ultimate man” [ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴ]. After Totila’s death, the Goths’ desperate 
situation, explained Procopius, forced them to seek a “virtuous death” [θανατιάω 
ἀρετῇ]. Their “despair of the situation” was the primary reason for the Goths’ 
“extraordinary courage” [εὐτoλμίαν].146 Although he praised both sides’ conduct 
during the struggle, Procopius saved his highest acclamation for the Gothic king, 
exclaiming that Teïas’ actions compared to those of “heroes of legend” [λεγομένων 
ἡρώων]. Meeting his end like a true hero, the Gothic leader, “easily recognised by 
all, stood with only a few followers at the head of the phalanx”. Teïas slew so many 
Romans that he needed to keep replacing his shields as they filled with enemy 
spears. Finally, after fighting continuously for several hours, Teïas was slain as he 
attempted to exchange another shield with his bodyguard.147 
With his heroic death in battle, Teïas finally obtained the type of noble and 
manly demise that had eluded all of the previous Gothic kings in the Gothic Wars. 
143 For Procopius’ befuddlement at the “cowardice” [δειλίαν] of Totila, see Wars 8.32.28-30.
144 Procopius provided two versions of Totila’s death. In the first account (Wars 8.32.22-
28), Totila fled during the rout, and subsequently he was mortally wounded from be-
hind. In the second and, according to Procopius, less credible version (Wars 8.32.33-
36), Totila was struck by a missile while fighting as a common soldier.
145 E.g., Kaldellis, Procopius’ Persian War (cited n. 100) 257.
146 Procopius, Wars 8.35.20-21 (my trans.). 
147 Procopius, Wars 8.35.21-30 (trans. Dewing).
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This ideal death may suggest that Procopius and his Byzantine readership may 
not have viewed Teïas’ demise or the Goths’ defeat as heart breaking. Procopius 
appeared to follow traditional literary models that made it clear that defeat in 
battle was not shameful or tragic as long as one faced it with honour.148 Pro-
copius’ account clearly has a literary ring to it. It also suspiciously ties up some 
of the loose threads in his narrative. First, Teïas’ death in battle finally allowed 
Procopius to show a member of the Gothic royalty dying as Vitigis said they 
wished, in battle. Second, a gallant final clash featuring two worthy opponents 
fighting, in the words of Procopius, “with the fury of wild beasts”, made a fitting 
terminus for an account that strove to describe and compare the martial and 
the manly virtues of the Goths and the Romans. While appreciating the fighting 
qualities and, indeed, the manliness of the Goths, the historian had confirmed the 
Byzantines as the superior and the manlier side. In the end, the martial prowess 
of the Goths had proven inferior to the organization, leadership, weaponry, and 
manly ἀρετή and ἀνδρεία of the Byzantine soldiers. Finally, though unspoken, 
Procopius had fulfilled his stated purpose at the outset of the Wars, which was to 
relate the worthiness of the martial deeds and the prowess of the contemporary 
Roman soldiers to his Byzantine audience. By defeating a martial and heroic foe 
like the Goths, Procopius had succeeded in establishing that Justinian’s soldiers 
were at least the equals of their ancient counterparts. One should consider Pro-
copius’ depiction of the battle of Mons Lactarius, and indeed, the entire Gothic 
Wars in this context.149
Queensland University
148 For this concept in Polybius, see A.M. Eckstein, Moral Vision in the Histories of Poly-
bius. Berkeley 1995, 42-43.
149 Of course, it is important to emphasise that the individual who had achieved these two 
dynamic victories over the Goths, Narses, was a eunuch. For some of my readers, the 
presence of a eunuch in such an essential military role may seem to undermine the con-
nection made throughout this essay between martial virtues and hegemonic masculin-
ity. In Procopius’ telling, however, Narses’ identity as a castrate did little to hinder his 
military acumen. Though Procopius depicted Narses, at times, as vain, jealous, insub-
ordinate, and petty, the historian generally respected Narses for being a successful and 
resourceful commander. Though Procopius perceived Narses as an anomalous example 
of a eunuch (e.g. Wars 6.13.16-17), he certainly sees him as a man. Indeed, Procopius 
reported with little sense of irony that Narses’ supporters in the officer corps hoped 
that the eunuch would achieve his own fame through “deeds of wisdom and manliness” 
[ἔργα ξυνέσεώς τε καὶ ἀνδρείας, Wars 6.18.7].Procopius’ presentation of Narses does 
not indicate that just any eunuch could become an able military commander, only that 
in certain instances, just as one can find manly women and restrained barbarians, one 
can find a vigorous, and indeed, a manly eunuch.
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Abstract
Much of the recent work on gender constructions in the writings of the sixth-
century Byzantine writer Procopius have focused on his Secret History. Yet, the 
crucial role that gender constructions play in his other writings has garnered far 
less notice. This essay concentrates on one theatre of war, Italy, and examines how 
in the Gothic Wars Procopius used the field of battle as a means to comment on 
the role that courage and manliness played in determining the outcome of the 
war. The conflict, in Procopius’ telling, offered the Byzantines the opportunity 
not only to regain Italy, but also to test their military and manly virtues against 
a worthy enemy, the Goths.
